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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
IN RE ANTHONY W.: THE ACCOMPLICE 
CORROBORATION RULE APPLIES TO JUVENILE 
PROCEEDINGS 
By: Taren Stanton 
In a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals ofMaryland held 
the accomplice corroboration rule, which states uncorroborated 
accomplice testimony is insufficiently reliable to be sole basis for a 
conviction, applies to juvenile proceedings. In re Anthony W., 388 
Md. 251, 255, 879 A.2d 717, 719 (2005). Further, the Court held the 
juvenile court was not clearly erroneous in finding that the State's 
witnesses were not accomplices whose testimony required 
corroboration. /d. 
During the night of May 10, 2002, Jose Gonzales ("Gonzales"), 
Keith Steers ("Steers"), and Anthony W. ("Anthony") were driving 
aimlessly around Frederick County. According to Steers, Anthony 
told Gonzales to stop the car in the parking lot of Kemptown 
Elementary School and Gonzales complied. Anthony exited and went 
toward a school bus. Anthony broke glass in the front door, entered 
the bus, smashed a number of windows and sprayed the interior with a 
fire extinguisher. Steers and Gonzales testified they entered the bus 
and attempted to stop Anthony from causing additional damage. 
Steers and Gonzales testified they did not break any windows, but 
admitted to stealing a box of flares from the bus. Anthony was 
charged in juvenile court with malicious destruction of property based 
in part on the testimony of Steers and Gonzales. Neither Steers nor 
Gonzales were prosecuted in exchange for their testimony. 
At the conclusion of the State's case, Anthony moved for dismissal. 
He alleged the State's case consisted of uncorroborated testimony 
from two accomplices, Gonzales and Steers. The motion was denied. 
On November 14, 2002, the Circuit Court for Frederick County, sitting 
as a Juvenile Court, found that Anthony was involved in the 
delinquent act. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgment 
of the trial court concluding the two witnesses were accomplices to the 
illegal act and therefore their testimony required corroboration. 
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The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted the State's petition for 
writ of certiorari to evaluate two issues. First, whether the Court of 
Special Appeals erred in holding the accomplice corroboration rule 
applied in juvenile cases. Second, whether the Court of Special 
Appeals erred in concluding that insufficient evidence was presented 
to find the two witnesses were accomplices whose testimony required 
corroboration to sustain the juvenile's adjudication. 
The Court of Appeals began its analysis by examining the 
accomplice corroboration rule as applied to adults. !d. at 264-265, 879 
A.2d at 724-725. The Court noted that the accomplice corroboration 
rule was first stated in Luery v. State, 116 Md. 284, 81 A. 681 ( 1911) 
and the necessity for the rule was later explained in Watson v. State, 
208 Md. 210, 117 A.2d 549 (1955). Anthony W., 388 Md. at 264, 879 
A.2d at 724. The rule was upheld in Brown v. State, 281 Md. 241, 3 78 
A.2d 1104 (1977), because of the trend to use accomplices as State's 
witnesses and the concerns about the reliability of accomplice 
testimony. Anthony W., 388 Md. at 264-265, 879 A.2d at 724-725. 
The Court relied substantially on juvenile case law in determining 
whether the rule applied to juvenile proceedings. !d. at 265-267, 879 
A.2d at 725-726. The development of specific protections similar to 
those provided adults was first discussed in depth by the United States 
Supreme Court in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428 (1967). 
Anthony W., 388 Md. at 266, 879 A.2d at 725. Since Gault, this Court 
recognized that some, but not all, rights granted to a criminal 
defendant were applicable in juvenile proceedings. Anthony W., 388 
Md. at 267, 879 A.2d at 726 (citing In re Thomas J, 372 Md. 50, 58-
59,811 A.2d 310,315 (2002)). 
Although the Court had previously addressed the application of 
constitutional protections to juveniles, it noted that this specific 
evidentiary rule had not been analyzed. !d. at 267, 879 A.2d at 726. 
Accordingly, the Court looked to other jurisdictions that had discussed 
the issue for guidance. !d. The Court found support for extending the 
rule in a Georgia statute that "requires that a Court must find on proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the child committed the acts by reason 
of which he is alleged to be delinquent." !d. at 268, 879 A.2d at 726-
727 (citing TL.T v. State, 212 S.E.2d 650, 653 (1975)). Based on the 
statute, the court in TL. T concluded that a juvenile charged with 
delinquency was entitled to "independent corroborative evidence of an 
accomplice's testimony." Anthony W., 388 Md. at 268-269, 879 A.2d 
at 727. The Court also found a Nevada opinion which extended the 
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corroboration rule to juvenile proceedings. I d. (citing A Minor v. 
Juvenile Dept. Fourth Jud. Dist., 608 P.2d 509 (1980)). 
The Court found that Maryland Rule § 11-114( e)( 1 ), requiring 
allegations that a juvenile committed a delinquent act be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, was most similar to juvenile court statutes 
in Georgia and Nevada. Id. at 271-272, 879 A.2d at 729. The Court 
also recognized the right of proof beyond a reasonable doubt applied 
to both adults and juveniles by the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. at 272, 
879 A.2d at 729. Since the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of 
proof is the same standard applied in adult criminal cases, the Court 
held the same evidentiary concerns regarding accomplice testimony 
were also present in juvenile cases. Id. The Court found further 
support from the Court of Special Appeals of Mary land, which pointed 
out that a juvenile faced with placement in a state facility is no less 
entitled to benefit of the rule than an adult faced with possible 
incarceration for committing an offense. Id. at 273, 879 A.2d at 729. 
Although Chapter 900 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure governs 
juvenile proceedings, the Court concluded the rule should be extended 
to juvenile proceedings in the interest of fundamental fairness. Id. 
Furthermore, the Court held the Court of Special Appeals erred in 
concluding insufficient evidence was proffered to find the two 
witnesses were accomplices to the delinquent act. Id. at 280, 879 A.2d 
at 734. The Court of Appeals found support for its argument by 
analogizing the facts to Coleman v. State, 209 Md. 379, 386, 121 A.2d 
254, 257 (1956) and Seward v. State, 208 Md. 341, 346, 118 A.2d 505, 
507 (1955). Anthony W, 388 Md. at 274-275, 879 A.2d at 730-731. 
In Coleman, the accomplice corroboration rule did not apply because 
there was evidence that the alleged accomplice sat outside in the truck 
while the crime occurred and had no knowledge that a crime was 
planned. Anthony W, 388 Md. at 275, 879 A.2d at 731. In Seward, 
the defendant admitted that all participants in the act discussed setting 
off a bomb and knew he was making the bomb, so the accomplice rule 
applied. Anthony W, 388 Md. at 275, 879 A.2d at 731. Thus, the 
Court determined that Gonzales and Steers may have committed 
independent crimes at some point in the continuum but such acts did 
not make them accomplices to the act at issue. Id. at 279, 879 A.2d at 
733. There was no evidence that the witnesses knew Anthony 
intended to commit the delinquent acts and a rational trier of fact could 
have found that Steers and Gonzales were not accomplices. Id. 
In In re Anthony W, the Court of Appeals of Maryland established 
that the accomplice corroboration rule applied to juvenile proceedings. 
68 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 36 
This decision broadened the constitutional rights accorded to 
juveniles. More importantly, this case highlights the many parallels 
between adult and juvenile proceedings and the need for due process 
rights of all individuals, regardless of age. Furthermore, this decision 
reflects an increasingly common view of juvenile offenders as young 
criminals rather than youth in need of rehabilitation. As juvenile 
courts gain increasingly more constitutional rights, the need for a 
separate and distinct juvenile system may become less essential in the 
administration of justice. 
